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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CIVIL PIGHTS-SUBSTITUTION
OF PRIVATE TRUSTEES FOR MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT
EXCLUDE PUBLIC PARK FROM FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS*
Can a municipality as trustee of a charitable trust administer
a trust in a discriminatory manner? If not, can the municipality
resign as trustee and necessitate the appointment of private trus-
tees? If so, can the private trustees administer the trust in a dis-
criminatory manner as provided in the trust instrument? These
are among the important questions considered by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Evans 'v. Newton.1
The facts were not in dispute. In 1911, Senator Augustus 0.
Bacon devised a tract of land to the city of Macon, Georgia to
be used as a park and pleasure ground for white people only.
The city kept the park segregated for some years but in time
allowed Negroes to use it, taking the position that the park was
a public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and
maintain on a segregated basis. In 1964, the city resigned as
trustee and the court appointed three individuals to the positions.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the appointment, hold-
ing that Senator Bacon had the right to bequeath his property to
a limited class, that charitable trusts are subject to supervision
of a court of equity, and that there is an undisputed power to
appoint new trustees so that the purpose of the trust would not
fail.
2
The United States Supreme Court, reversing and remanding
the case to the Georgia court, held that the "public character of
this park requires that it be treated as a public institution sub-
ject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless
of who now has title under state law." 3 Since the only issue
raised by the parties was the validity of the appointment of the
private trustees, the Court departed from the established rule
of avoiding constitutional questions unless presented by the
* Evans v. Newton, 86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966).
1. 86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966).
2. Evans v. Newton, 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573 (1964).
3. Evans v. Newton, 86 Sup. Ct. 486, 490 (1966).
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record.4 This decision, however, made unnecessary a later deci-
sion when and if the private trustees attempt to operate the park
in a segregated manner.
The most difficult question facing the Court was whether the
racial discrimination anticipated in the operation of Baconsfield
Park by the private trustees falls within the purview of the con-
stitutional prohibitions.5 Since the Civil Rights Cases( it has
been settled that the fourteenth amendment forbids only dis-
crimination which "may fairly be said to be that of the States."T
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority the court said that
"private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to
the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have be-
come involved in it.""
State action-action by the government which brings the dis-
crimination within the purview of the fourteenth amendment-
is a term of shifting content. Its application requires two ele-
ments: (1) governmental action in fact, and (2) such action in a
context of sufficiently grave social implications to persuade the
court of the necessity of federal correction. 9 The courts have
gone to great lengths to find these elements whenever the sit-
uation demanded. They have had very little difficulty in finding
state action when the city owned or operated the facility,10
leased the property,1 compelled the discrimination by statute or
4. Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U.S. 129 (1946);
Tennessee Publishing Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 18 (1936); City
of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930); Liverpool, N.Y. & Pa. S.S.
Co. v. Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33 (1885); Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
5. U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV.
6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Accord, Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
8. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
9. Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and The Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1002 (1957).
10. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Griffin v. Board of
Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964) ; New Orleans City Park Improve-
ment Ass'n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) ; City of St. Petersburg
v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d
93 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Dawson v. City of Baltimore, 220 F2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955);
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948).
11. Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Department
of Conservation and Dev. v. Tate, 231 F2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956). Contra,
Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
19661
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ordinance,12 delegated certain powers and rights,13 had a rever-
sion to the property 14 or contributed funds to the institution.15
State action has also been found when courts have tried to en-
force discriminatory pr. visions in an agreement between private
individuals 0 or to award damages for breach of such an agree-
ment.
17
There are a number of other decisions, however, where the
governmental action was more nebulous and the connecting link
more questionable. In establishing a balancing test, the Court
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority said that "only by
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious
involvements of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance.""' An example of this principle is the case of
Terry v. Adams,19 where a half-century old political organization
that excluded Negroes from its membership, conducted a straw
primary prior to the statutory primary. Even though no connec-
tion with the governmental function could be established, the
Court noted that a victory in the straw primary was tantamount
to victory in the regular election, and held that the "inaction" of
the state in permitting the use of any device that produced the
equivalent of the regular election was a violation of the fifteenth
amendment. In Marsh v. Alabama,20 the Court reversed the con-
viction of a woman arrested on the streets of a company-owned
town for handing out religious literature. A state statute pro-
vided that it was a crime to enter and remain on the premises
of another after having been warned not to do so. The Court
held that a state is not justified in permitting a corporation to
govern a community so as to restrict fundamental liberties. It
12. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (municipal ordinance making
it unlawful to move to certain areas depending on race); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (statute preventing Negroes from serving on
jury).
13. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (delegation to a party of the
power to fix the qualifications of primary elections) ; Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (operated under agency authorized by Congress).
14. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (reves-
sionary clause sufficient complete present control and interest making the dis-
crimination state action so as to deny equal protection of the laws as guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment).
15. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
16. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (attempted enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant).
17. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
18. 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
19. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
20. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
[Vol. 18
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should be noted that the state did not condone the constitutional
violation but was only concerned with the protection of property
rights. It would seem that had the conviction concerned a pri-
vately owned farm as opposed to a privately owned town, no con-
stitutional question would have been presented. Apparently the
deciding factor was the character of the premises concerned as
opposed to the presence or absence of state action. -
Possibly a further extension of the state action doctrine is the
case of Shelley v. Kraerner21 which held that a state court may
not enforce a racially restrictive covenant in an agreement be-
tween private parties affecting private property. Whether
Shelley will be confined to its facts or stand for the broader
proposition that any form of judicial action in aid of private
discrimination is prohibited state action is not known. The 1964:
case of Griffin v. Maryland22 is a good indication, however, of
the Court's attitude and the present trend. In this case the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction for trespass of five
Negroes who were arrested by a deputy sheriff under the au-
thority of the owner of a private amusement park. The Court
held that the action by an individual who is possessed of state
authority and purports to act under that authority, is state
action. Griffin could be a very important decision since the
Court did not go so far as the judicial action in Shelley to find
state action, but only to the mere arrest of the trespassers.
The exact holding in Evans is uncertain since the only issue
certified to the Supreme Court was the substitution of private
trustees for the city of Macon. In view, however, of In re Girard
College Trusteeship23 the holding is probably not to be construed
as reversing the appointment of the private trustees, but only
that given the appointment, the private trustees could not op-
erate Baconsfield Park in a discriminatory manner. This holding
was based to some extent on an assumption by the Supreme Court
that the municipality was involved in the operation of the park:
"We only hold that where the tradition of municipal control had
become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that
the mere substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park
21. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
22. 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
23. In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A2d 844 (1958), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). The court substituted private individuals as trus-
tees in place of Board of City Trusts in order to carry out intent of testator
after the Supreme Court held that the Board, being a state agency, could not
administer orphanage in discriminatory manner.
1966]
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from the public to the private sector. '24 Since the fact of the
city's involvement or non-involvement in the park will be a
matter later litigated on remand, the remaining discussion will
assume a finding of non-involvement except the tax exemption
granted to charitable trusts. The remaining question then is
whether the Court's holding was in reality based on the city's
assumed involvement or whether the decision would have been
the same if there had been in fact no involvement on the part
of the city.
Recalling the Court's proficiency in finding state action, this
requirement presents little difficulty in this situation. In a testa-
mentary trust, the power to dispose of property at death is a
privilege granted by the state and supervised through probate
and administration by courts and judicially appointed fidu-
ciaries. Furthermore, a charitable trust becomes operative only
after a court has found either specifically or by inference that
it is charitable.25 It is likely that such state involvement in sanc-
tioning a discriminatory provision in a trust would be sufficient
state action to invoke constitutional protection considering that
the Court in Terry and Marsk held that the states "inaction" in
permitting the discrimination was sufficient.
Therefore, conceding state action in any given case, the prob-
lem becomes a weighing of the individual's right to discriminate
against the constitutionally required public concern against dis-
crimination.26 The right to discriminate can be measured by its
effect on the community, and whether it is incidental and harm-
less or touches the essentials of democracy.27 Two elements seem
to be important in determining whether the use is public or
private and subject to the fourteenth amendment prohibitions:
First, is the activity one which is commonly undertaken by the
state; and second, is the activity open to the public or a large
segment thereof ?28
24. 86 Sup. Ct. 486, 489-90 (1966). (emphasis added.) This assumption was
not based on any facts presented in the record. As a matter of fact, Senator
Bacon left other property in trust precisely in order to maintain Baconsfield
Park and an inference that the park was privately maintained in all respects
could be more readily drawn. See 86 Sup. Ct. 486, 489 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
25. Clark, supra note 9, at 1003-04.
26. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. Rav. 347 (1963).
27. Clark, supra note 9, at 1014.
28. Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. lxv.
213, 218 (1956).
[Vol. 18
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The controlling factor is the nature of the function per-
formed29 and a collateral or apparent state connection with a
private litigant merely presents an additional factor which con-
tributes to an effective weighing and balancing of interest within
the permitted latitudes of due process and equal protection.80
The trend seems to be toward a more sensible road of evaluating
the constitutional issue on the merits rather than letting the
accident of state action make the determination.81 In E Vans, the
Court said:
[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the
State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they
become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and sub-
ject to its constitutional limitations . . . .32
The service rendered even by a private park of this charac-
ter is municipal in nature . . . and . . . a park . . . is more
like a fire department or police department that traditional-
ly serves the community.
[T]he . . . public character of this park requires that it
be treated as a public institution subject to the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title
under state law.
88
Thus the case more clearly seems to be holding that the park can-
not be operated in a discriminatory manner by the private trus-
tees regardless of the city's involvement or non-involvement in
the operation of the park. The length of time the park has ex-
isted, the public character of the park, the municipal purpose of
the park, the service rendered to the community by the park,
and the momentum it acquired as a public facility, 4 weighed
against the purpose and result of discrimination will surely yield
a desegregated Baconsfield Park.
Thus concluding that the park cannot be operated in a dis-
criminatory manner, the problem arises as to the disposition or
29. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 1083, 1100
(1960).
30. Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of
State Action, 1965 Dux. LJ. 219, 244-45.
31. Williams, supra note 26, at 382. See generally Alstyne & Karst, State
Action, 14 STAN. L. Rlv. 3 (1961).
32. 86 Sup. Ct. 486, 488 (1966).
33. Id. at 490.
34. Id. at 489-90.
1966]
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use of the property since the trust cannot be administered as
directed.35
The doctrine of cy pres is a saving device often applied to
charitable trusts so that when the precise intention of the settlor
cannot be carried out, his intention can be fulfilled as near as
possible.30 This doctrine, which is recognized in Georgia, 37 is
defined in the Restatement of Trusts:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular
charitable purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or im-
practicable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose,
and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not
fail but the court will direct the application of the property
to some charitable purpose which falls within the general
charitable intention of the settlor.38
Generally, before the cy pres doctrine will be applied three
prerequisites must be met: (1) The court must find that the gift
created a valid charitable trust; (2) it must be established that
it is to some degree impossible or impractical to carry out the
specific purposes of the trust; and (3) there must be a general
charitable intention.3 9 The first two of these are met in the Evans
case. The requirement of a general charitable intention has given
35. The pertinent part of Senator Bacon's will read as follows:
[I]n trust for the sole, perpetual and unending, use, benefit and enjoyment
of the white women, white girls, white boys and white children of the
city of Macon to be by them forever used and enjoyed as a park and
pleasure ground ... the said property under no circumstances, or by any
authority whatsoever, to be sold or alienated or disposed of, or at any
time for any reason devoted to any other purpose or use excepting so far
as herein specifically authorized . . . . I take occasion to say that in
limiting the use and enjoyment of this property perpetually to white
people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of
consideration for the Negroes or colored people. On the contrary I have
for them the kindest feeling, and for many of them esteem and regard,
while for some of them I have sincere personal affection.
I am, however, without hesitation in the opinion that in their social
relations the two races should be forever separate and that they should
not have pleasure or recreation grounds to be used or enjoyed, together
and in common.
Brief for Respondents, pp. 3-5, Evans v. Newton, 86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966).
36. See FIscH, THE CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1950).
37. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 108-202, 113-815 (1959). The cy pres doctrine is not
recognized in South Carolina. Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S.C. 455, 77 S.E. 131 (1913) ;
Pringle v. Dorsey, 3 S.C. 502 (1872) ; Attorney General v. Jolly, 2 Strob. Eq.
379 (S.C. 1848). The South Carolina Bar Association has recommended that
South Carolina adopt the doctrine of cy pres. 1 S.C.L.Q. 331 (1949).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
39. Fiscn, supra note 39, at 128.
[Vrol. 18
7
Curlee: COMMENTS
Published by Scholar Commons,
COIMENTs
rise to the most problems and the decisions are to a great extent
irreconcilable.
There are no Georgia cases in point and only a few from other
jurisdictions with similar factual situations. 40 A general chari-
table intent has been found despite the fact that the terms of the
trust provide that the property be devoted to a particular "pur-
pose and no other purpose." These phrases have been held to
merely emphasize the wish of the donor that the property should
be devoted to the designated purpose as long as possible or prac-
tical and they do not necessarily indicate that the charitable
gift shall fail if it ever should become impossible or impractical
to carry out the designated purpose. 41 The policy of favoring
charities has led the courts, in determining whether the settlor
had a general charitable intent, to construe the trust instrument
most strongly against the settlor and his heirs.42 Professor Scott
says that where a testator's intention is clear that the property
should be applied to a particular purpose which failed, many
cases have held that cy pres would not apply. He notes, however,
that a majority of jurisdictions would hold otherwise. 43
Where there is a subsequent failure of the trust after the gift
has taken effect, the courts have less difficulty in finding a gen-
eral charitable intent than when the particular object has ceased
to exist before the gift takes effect.44 Where at the time of the
creation of the trust it is possible and practical to carry out the
specific provisions of the testator, but in the course of time con-
ditions change so that it becomes impossible or impractical to
carry out these directions, the cy pres doctrine is almost invari-
ably applied, and it is rare indeed that the trust is held to fail
altogether.45 The Restatement of Trusts takes the position that
as a matter of public policy it might well be that cy pres should
always be applied where there is a subsequent failure of the
40. In Howard Say. Institution v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961), the
court struck a limitation to American-born, Protestant, Gentile boys under the
doctrine of cy pres. In La Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d
530 (1959), the court refused to apply cy pres where the use of a playfield was
limited to white children. However in this case the gift had not as yet taken
effect as is the situation in Evants v. Newton.
41. See FiscH, supra note 39, at 158. See ScoTT, TRUSTS § 399.2 (1939);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399, comment b (1935).
42. See FiscH, supra note 39, at 158.
43. 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 399.3, at 2846-47 (2d ed. 1956) and cases there cited.
Accord, Connecticut Bank and Trust Co. v. Coles, 150 Conn. 569, 192 A.2d 202
(1963).
44. Fisci, supra note 39, at 153. RESTATEMENT (SEcoI"), TRUSTS § 399,
comment i (1959).
45. 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 399.3, at 2844 (2d ed. 1956).
1966]
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particular purpose and that the property should never revert
to the settlor or his estate, the reversion being more undesirable
as the period of time grows longer between the creation of the
trust and the failure of the particular purpose.4" Professor Bo-
gert recommends a provision whereby a charitable intent would
be presumed to be general unless the settlor expressly negates
the application of cy pres.47 The modern trend seems to be that
courts apply a rule that every donor who dedicates property to a
specific charitable purpose, institution or organization possesses
in addition a broader charitable intent.48 The only positive way
to insure specific desired use of trust property is probably a pro-
vision in the instrument that the property is to be used in the
manner directed or it shall revert to the settlor or his heirs.4 9
It is difficult to draw any conclusion as to whether Georgia
will apply the cy pres doctrine in the Evans case since there is
no precedent in Georgia for such a situation; however, it is likely
that the court will follow the modern trend and weight of au-
thority to preserve Baconsfield Park as a playground for the
public in general.
RicB:Ait E. HoPsoN
46. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 399, comment i (1959).
47. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 436, at 424 (2d ed. 1964).
48. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1959).
49. 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 401.2, at 2864 (2d ed. 1956) ; RESTATEmENT (SEcoND),
TRUSTS § 399, comment c (1959).
[Vol. 18
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-ACCUSED
IN SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL MUST BE AFFORDED
COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL*
Until recently the individual safeguards afforded the military
accused under the Uniform Code of Military Justice were con-
sidered more extensive than those afforded by the civil courts.'
The increasingly broad interpretation of the Bill of Rights, how-
ever, has raised serious doubt as to whether the military accused
today is guaranteed all of the protections necessary for funda-
mental fairness.2 The right to the assistance of counsel has been
considerably expanded in recent years3 with the result that the
civilian accused seems at present to be afforded more protection
under the sixth amendment than the military accused.
Although it is well established that military due process is not
identical to its civilian counterpart, it has been held that court-
marital proceedings must comport with the minimal requirements
of constitutional due process to be immune from review in civi-
lian courts. 4 Gideon v. VainwrigUt5 held that the right of an
* Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
1. Besides affording the military accused many safeguards peculiar to the
military, most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated in-
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 831, 837, 838, 844,
846, 855 (1964). The Court of Military Appeals has stated that it will give the
above statutory provisions the same meaning as has been given their corres-
ponding constitutional safeguards. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74,
1 C.M.R. 74 (1951). See generally, Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Con-
stitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1957) ; Murphy,
The Defense of the Military Accused, 17 S.C.L. REv. 506 (1965) ; Quinn, The
United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 225 (1961); Sabel, Civil Safeguards Before Courts-Martial,
25 MINN. L. REv. 323 (1953); Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181 (1962); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights:
The Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1958); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 387,
398 (1951).
2. See generally, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) ; Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932) ; United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp.
171 (D.D.C. 1958); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411
(1963) ; United States v. Kraskekas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958).
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390 (1960).
4. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). The Chief Judge of the Court of
Military Appeals has written:
Military due process begins with the basic rights and privileges defined
in the federal constitution. It does not stop there. The letter and the
background of the Uniform Code [of Military Justice] add their weighty
demands to the requirements of a fair trial. Military due process is, thus,
not synonymous with federal civilian due process. It is basically that, but
something more, and something different.
291
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indigent accused to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental
protection of the Bill of Rights, thereby qualifying as a minimal
requirement of constitutional due process.6
In the wake of Gideon there has been some confusion as to the
indigent military accused's right to be represented by a lawyer
at special courts-martial. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
provides for the appointment of defense counsel at special courts-
marital, but does not set forth any qualifications for such coun-
sel, other than specifying that if the trial counsel happens to be
a lawyer the defense counsel must be similarly qualified3 The
accepted procedure has been for the convening authority of the
court-martial to appoint an officer as defense counsel, and the
appointment of officers without legal training or experience has
only recently been considered a failure to provide adequate
counsel."
In the recent case of Application of Stapley an army captain
and second lieutenant assigned to represent the petitioner in a
special court-martial were held unqualified to act as counsel,
resulting in a denial of the petitioner's right to the assistance of
Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process,
35 ST. Jo HN's L. REv. 225, 232 (1961). If Judge Quinn's opinion were the law
we might not have the problem dealt with in this paper. More indicative of
the present state of military due process is Mr. Justice Black's observation that
"it has not been clearly settled to what extent the Bill of Rights and other
protective parts of the Constitution apply to military trials." Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. It has been observed that the Supreme Court and the Court of Military
Appeals believe that military personnel are protected by fundamental consti-
tutional rights, and that the right to the assistance of counsel is among those
rights considered fundamental. Christensen, Pretrial Right to Counsel, MIL. L.
REv., 1964 (DA Pam 27-100-23, 1964), p. 29, n.162, 163.
7. A serviceman accused of a crime, -whose case has been referred to a court-
martial for trial, has for the past seventy-seven years been guaranteed the right
to counsel. For the past twelve years, this right has been codified in the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. In the case of a general court-martial, the de-
fense counsel is required to be a qualified lawyer, while in a special court-
martial counsel is not required to have any legal training or experience. 10
U.S.C. § 827 (1964). In special and summary courts-martial proceedings an
accused has the right to retain a lawyer at his own expense, with no provision
made to provide retained counsel for the indigent accused. When the accused
is advised of his right to retain counsel, due process is satisfied. United States
v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957). See Murphy, The De-
fense of the Military Accused, 17 S.C.L. REv. 506, 508-10 (1965); Wilder,
Relationship Between Appointed and Individual Defense Counsel, Mm. L. Rxv.,
1963 (DA Pam 27-100-21 1963) p. 37.
8. The competency of a military accused's counsel was challenged in the
following cases: Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Liner v. Cozart, 174
F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1949); Duval v. Humphrey, 83 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa.
1949); Ex parte Steele, 79 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
[Vol. 18
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counsel.9 The captain was a veterinarian with two years experi-
ence in the army, and the second lieutenant was one year out of
college with an academic background in history and political
science. Both of these officers had substantially no legal training,
but were appointed as defense counsel since they were officers
in the United States Army. The petitioner twice requested a law-
yer, but could not afford to retain civilian counsel ° and the
covening authority, in view of the accepted practice of appointing
officers to act as defense counsel in special courts-martial, re-
fused to provide legally qualified counsel. The petitioner was
convicted of the charges brought against him, and subsequently
requested a writ of habeas corpus from a federal district court.
Granting the writ the court held: "The services of 'defense coun-
sel' did not constitute the assistance of counsel, in any proper
sense.""- The court was careful, however, to limit its holding to
the facts of the case, which were at best unusual-the appointed
counsel were without any experience in court-martial procedure
and the charges brought against the petitioner were exceptionally
serious for a special court-martial. 12 Stapley, though holding the
appointed officers unqualified to act as counsel, did little to
clarify the qualifications required of defense counsel in special
courts-martial.
The history surrounding the Bill of Rights up until the last
drafts were sent to Congress gives some support to the view that
the sixth amendment was intended to apply to cases arising in
the land and naval forces. On the basis of such history one writer,
Gordon D. Henderson, has concluded that the protections af-
forded by the first ten amendments should be included in mili-
tary due process.13 After first determining that the application
9. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
10. The petitioner was considered by the court to be an indigent defendant.
Although there seems to be no standard for determining indigency in the mili-
tary, there is much authority on civilian indigency and the right to counsel.
Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 747 (1964); Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1957).
11. Application of Stapley, supra note 9, at 319.
12. The petitioner was charged with violation of §§ 86, 90, 117, 123, and 124
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice which involved not only breaches of
military orders and discipline, but also repeated acts of fraud in the issuance
of checks, which, if established, could have constituted felonies in a civil court
and all of which imputed moral turpitude. Application of Stapley, supra note 9,
at 318. Special courts-martial may adjudge any punishment not forbidden by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice except death, dishonorable discharge, dis-
missal, confinement in excess of six months, forfeiture of pay exceeding two-
thirds pay per month, of forfeiture of pay for a period exceeding six months.
10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964). It can be seen that special courts-martial may adjudge
severe punishment, making the need for legally-qualified defense counsel critical.
13. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 71 H~Av. L. REv. 293 (1957).
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of the Bill of Rights depends upon the construction given the
fifth and sixth amendments, he observes that the language of
the fifth amendment denies to the military accused the right to
a grand jury indictment. By specifically excepting a provision
of the amendment it seems obvious that the framers intended the
remaining provisions of the amendment to apply in military
prosecutions. In the sixth amendment, however, there is no
specific exception to the right to a trial by jury, but it is clear
that juries were not intended to be required in military pro-
ceedings. 4 This inconsistency can be reconciled only if the fram-
ers intended the exception in the fifth amendment to apply to
the jury provision in the sixth amendment, and their failure
to write an exception into the sixth amendment can be explained
only as oversight or poor draftsmanship. If such an exception
were intended to be written into the sixth amendment by its
drafters, the right of the indigent military accused to the assist-
ance of legally-qualified counsel might be more certain. However,
the failure of the early judiciary to recognize the right of mili-
tary accused to counsel raises considerable doubt as to whether
such a right was originally intended to apply to military trials.'5
Furthermore, treatises on military law failed to confirm the
right of a military accused to the assistance of counsel.'( These
treatises, as well as the first military codes 17 concurred with
Blackstonian common-law notion that the judge acted as counsel
for military prisoners, and that there was no place for defense
counsel in court-martial proceedings. These obsolete concepts
of military due process serve only as reflectors of the original
intent of the sixth amendment, but as such seem to refute the
theory that the framers and their contemporaries intended the
right of counsel to apply to the military accused.
In taking issue with the proposition that the right to counsel
be included in military due process another writer, F. B. Wiener,
14. Id. at 304.
15. There are no complete proceedings of trials by American Army courts-
martial prior to 1801 now in existence since all of the War Department files
were destroyed in 1800. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS MISCELLANEOUS 232, 603
(1834). The earliest complete proceedings date from 1808. 2 & 3 Proceedings
of Courts-Martial, War Office 131-488 (ms. in National Archives), reprinted
in 3 WILKINSON, MEMOIRS OF MY OWN TIMES (1816).
16. McComn, A TREATISE ON MARTIAL LAW, AND CoURTS MARTIAL; As
PRACTICED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 93 (1809). This early treatise
on military law supported the views expressed by Tytler, a noted Scottish
jurist, in AN ESSAY ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL
(1800).
17. Articles of War, Art. 69, Chap. 20, 2 Stat. 367 (1806).
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reprimands Henderson for misreading his authority.'8 He notes
that three early American presidents-James Madison, John
Quincy Adams, and James Monroe-had opportunity to affirm
the right of a military accused to counsel but failed to do so
when the right to counsel was denied in a number of widely pub-
licized military trials. The failure of President Madison to dis-
approve the practice of denying counsel in courts-martial has
added significance since he had earlier participated in the draft-
ing of the sixth amendment. Wiener's observations give weight
to the proposition that the original intent did not favor including
the right to counsel in military due process. It is unfortunate,
however, that Wiener could not have foreseen the Gideon deci-
sion before he summarized that the right to counsel today is "a
right only recently won, and that not universally nor in all
cases."' 9 Although the effect of Gideon has not yet been fully
appreciated, it has at least rendered Wiener's summary obsolete.
Today, in view of the Gideon rationale and the modernized
Uniform Code of Military Justice,20 the original intent of the
drafters of the sixth amendment seems to be only of academic
value. The Uniform Code of Military Justice has expressly pro-
vided for the appointment of counsel at special courts-martial 2 '
and Gideon has established that the right of an indigent accused
to the assistance of counsel is within the minimal requirements
of due process. Although some type of representation is thereby
guaranteed every accused, the competency of defense counsel
in special courts-martial is a yet unresolved issue-should such
counsel be required to have some legal training or experience?
In civil jurisprudence "counsel" has always been a synonym
for a member of the legal profession, and the entrance require-
ments to that profession require an extensive knowledge of the
law. On the other hand, "counsel" in a special court-martial is
not required to have had any training or experience in the law.
Thus, although the accused is guaranteed representation in a
special court-martial, such "counsel" may be as ignorant of the
law as is the accused. Such representation is in the nature of a
sham and certainly does not constitute the right to counsel as
contemplated in the sixth amendment. It seems that the only way
18. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I,
72 HARV. L. Rxv. 1 (1958).
19. Id. at 5.
20. 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 831, 837, 838, 844, 846, 855 (1964). See generally note
1 supra.
21. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964). See generally note 7 .supra.
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to prevent such cases of the "juridically blind leading the blind"
and to insure adequate representation in special courts-martial
is to establish minimum qualifications for the defense counsel.
In Stapley the court was careful to restrict its decision to the
facts, but in holding that the representation allowed the accused
amounted to a "mockery," the court stated:
[I]t is no longer either reasonable or necessary, if it ever
were, to deem any officer qualified to act as defense counsel
for an accused merely because he is an officer; nor is it either
reasonable or necessary to limit the availability of qualified
defense counsel to cases in which the prosecution is repre-
sented by qualified counsel. 22
By this dictum, the court seems to be advocating a policy
requiring the defense counsel in a special court-martial to have
at least some training and experience, 23 but not restricting such
counsel to lawyers. The court's language implies that the civilian
accused who is guaranteed the assistance of a lawyer is entitled
to more protection under the sixth amendment than is the mili-
tary accused.
The expressions of the Court of Military Appeals, the highest
military court of review, indicate the military accused in a
special court-martial is not guaranteed the right to legally-
trained counsel.24 It should be noted, however, that the Court
of Military Appeals stated in United States v. Clay,25 that it
would give the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice the same meaning as has been given corresponding constitu-
tional provisions. Despite this assertion the Court of Military
Appeals has not yet adopted the Gideon rationale as the inter-
pretation of the Code's provisions for counsel, and it seems
doubtful that such an interpretation will be compelled by the
dictum in Clay. The court's reasoning in denying the right of the
military accused to legally-trained counsel is that military ex-
22. Application of Stapley, supra note 9, at 321.
23. The court felt that an appointed counsel should possess at least "minimal
qualifications to rationally advise on substantive and procedural legal problems
...." Ibid.
24. A majority of the Court of Military Appeals feels that constitutional
guarantees should not apply to persons in military service. United States v.
Deain, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 44, 17 C.M.R. 44 (1954) (separate opinion), Id. at 46,
17 C.M.R. at 56 (concurring opinion); United States v. Welch, 1 U.S.C.M.A.
402, 407, 3 C.M.R. 136, 142 (1952) (dictum). However, in the wake of Burns
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), Chief Judge Quinn declared that constitutional
guarantees apply to the military accused. United States v. Voorhees, 4
U.S.C.M.A. 509, 531, 16 C.M.R. 83, 105 (1954). See generally note 4 supra.
25. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
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pediency dictates that all the rights of the civilian accused can-
not be made available to the military accused.26 By this reason-
ing, if the military accused is to be guaranteed the right to
legally-trained counsel at special courts-martial this guarantee
must not impair the "expediency" of the military establishment.
However, the power to curtail constitutional rights in the name
of military necessity is kept in check by civil courts and the writ
of habeas corpus. Burns 'v. Wilson made it clear that when a
court-martial results in a deprivation of the accused's constitu-
tional rights, a federal district court has jurisdiction and may
declare the conviction void by issuing a writ of habeas corpus.2 7
The writ has therefore reserved to the civil courts the ultimate
decision in determining the constitutional rights of the accused.
Chief Justice Warren has recognized the uneasy relationship
between the military and the Bill of Rights.28 l He feels that a
modification of the traditional theory of military autonomy has
been necessitated by the growth of the military establishment
to its present size. At Washington's inauguration the armed
forces totalled six hundred and seventy-two men; today, millions
of citizens are serving in a military capacity, and the size of the
military establishment is increasing at a rapid rate. Now more
than ever the principle of civil supremacy should be emphasized,
and the military establishment reminded that the Bill of Rights
is the supreme law of the land. In advocating the inclusion of
the minimal requirements of civilian due process in military due
process, Mr. Justice Warren refers to the "vertical reach" of
the Bill of Rights; however, the Chief Justice doesn't elaborate
on the distinctions between civilian and military varieties of due
process.
Although the Supreme Court extended habeas corpus review
to include the denial of constitutional rights in 193829 it was
26. The protections of the Bill of Rights "which are expressly or by necessary
implication inapplicable" are not available to members of the armed forces.
United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 246, 247 (1960).
27. 346 U.S. 137 (1953). The Supreme Court indicated that the Bill of Rights
applied to the military accused, but held that the denial by courts-martial of
constitutional rights should be considered on the merits by civil courts only if
military authorities have not given them adequate consideration, stating that
"it is the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the military
have given fair consideration to each of these claims." Id. at 144. However, the
court did not explain what was meant by "fair consideration." See also Griffiths
v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 691 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
28. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964). See generally note 7, supra.
29. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In 1950, however, the Supreme
Court seemed to overlook Zerbst and held that the scope of civil court review
of courts-martial should not extend to constitutional questions. Hiatt v. Brown,
339 U.S. 103 (1950). Hiatt was overruled by Burns v. Wilson, supra note 27.
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not until 1953 that the Supreme Court held that court-martial
proceedings could be challenged through habeas corpus actions
brought in civil courts if those proceedings denied the petitioner
fundamental constitutional rights.30 Civil courts have been re-
luctant to review court-martial proceedings even where there
has been a constitutional question involved since civil courts have
traditionally taken a "hands-off" attitude toward military pro-
ceedings.31 The first civil court cases which confronted the issue
of the right to legally-qualified counsel in courts-martial evaded
ruling on the issue,32 and it was not until 1965 that a civil court
squarely met the right to counsel issue in the Stapley case.33 The
stage is set for a Supreme Court ruling on the issue, and if Mr.
Justice Warren's opinion represents that of the majority, the
Stapley decision is likely to be accepted and expanded.
In conclusion, the right of the indigent military accused in a
special courts-martial to the assistance of legally-qualified coun-
sel is as yet uncertain. An historical analysis of the sixth amend-
ment indicates that the right to the assistance of counsel was
not originally intended to be made available to the military
accused, but recent cases and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice indicate otherwise. The Stapley decision at best provides
only a negative standard, and that standard is without precedent
or affirmation. It is likely that the Supreme Court will find it
necessary to furnish more definite standards for military due
process in accord with the proposition that our citizens in uni-
form must not be stripped of their basic rights simply because
they have doffed their civilian clothes. Thus it is probable that
the right of an indigent accused to the assistance of counsel as
established in Gideon will be extended to guarantee the indigent
military accused the right to legally-qualified counsel before a
special court-martial.
RuDoLPH C. BAR-s, JR.
30. Burns v. Wilson, supra, note 27.
31. Civil courts were limited to a very narrow power of review following
Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863) ; that this policy has clearly been
changed is indicated by Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 29, and Burns v. Wilson,
supra note 27.
32. The court held that the petitioner's allegation of incompetency of counsel
could have been raised at the courts-martial and his failure to raise the issue
at the court-martial precluded the court's consideration of the issue on a writ
of habeas corpus. See Allen v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
Accord, Wilson v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
33. Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). In another
recent decision the court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds the claim that a
court-martial conviction was invalid due to the denial of the accused's right to
counsel. Ashe v. McNamara, 243 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1965).
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LABOR LAW-LOCKOUTS-RETURN TO THE COMMON
LAW RULING THAT A LOCKOUT BY A SINGLE
EMPLOYER IS A LEGITIMATE
BARGAINING DEVICE*
A lockout has been defined in general as the closing of a place
of employment or the "cessation of the furnishing of work to
employees by an employer in order that he may secure for him-
self more desirable terms of employment."' At common law it
was viewed as a legitimate device which could be used by an
employer to coerce his employees into agreeing to certain terms
and conditions of employment which he might desire. Because
lockout powers were virtually unlimited, it could be used for
almost any purpose, even to the disparagement of unionism.2
One of the principal reasons for the historical recognition as a
right fettered only by an employer's discretion was that the
power to lockout was viewed as a corollary to the employee's
right to strike.3 After nearly a quarter of a century of restricting
the use of bargaining lockouts, the United States Supreme Court
recently returned substantially to the common law view in
Ameriean Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB. 4
The validity of the bargaining lockout was never seriously
doubted until the enactment of the Wagner5 and the Taft-Hart-
ley Acts.6 Even though the Wagner Act was completely silent on
the subject and the Taft-Hartley Act neither authorized nor
prohibited it, labor litigation following this legislation began
to restrict and categorize it.7 Three different types of lockouts
emerged and were subsequently labeled :8 (1) the defensive multi-
* American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
1. Iron Molders v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908)
(concurring opinion).
2. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 140 Fed. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1905); Annot,
173 A.L.R. 675 (1948).
3. Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1952); Iron Molders v.
Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908); McGrath v. Norman, 221
App. Div. 804, 223 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1927).
4. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). Lockouts called to defeat unionism are still pro-
hibited. See text accompanying note 16, infra.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (Supp. IV, 1963).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. IV, 1963).
7. Ravena Sportswear, 142 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1963); North Country Motors,
Ltd., 133 N.L.R.B. 1479 (1961); Liberty Coach Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 160 (1960).
8. Meltyer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Showdowns in an Old Ter-
rain, 28 U. Cmi. L. REv. 614 (1961); Meltzer, Stngle-Employer and Multi-
Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. Cm. L. Rav. 70 (1956).
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employer lockout, (2) the defensive economic lockout, and (3)
the offensive bargaining lockout.
The defensive multi-employer lockout -was an exception to the
rule created by the National Labor Relations Board that bar-
gaining lockouts were generally invalid. This exception was
expressed in NLRB v. T uck Drivers Local No. 49,9 popularly
known as the Buffalo Linen case, in -which the Supreme Court
said that all members of a group of employers who had banded
together for the common purpose of collective bargaining1 -were
free to lockout in order to avoid the union "whipsaw." This is a
method by which each employee-member of an individual unit
would strike separately and successively in order to force the
employer to accept the demands of the union or lose his business
to his operating competitors. Thus, in circumstances in which
the integrity of the multi-employer unit was threatened, the
Board was required to permit the use of the lockout, and a par-
tial resurrection of the bargaining lockout was effected. This
case left open, however, the crucial question of whether a single
employer could use the bargaining lockout in the same manner
in which the union uses the strike.
Another exception to the general invalidity of lockouts was
the defensive economic lockout. The Board permitted an em-
ployer to shut down his plant operations in order to safeguard
against loss where there were reasonable grounds for believing
that a strike was threatening or imminent.-' All that was neces-
sary was for the employer to show that union activity was actu-
ally or potentially detrimental to his organization. 12 Interna-
tional ,Shoe o.13 justified the use of a lockout by a single em-
ployer when it was used for economic purposes provided the
employer was not motivated by any animus against the union
or its employees therein. The Board said that a "union, which
chose to use an economic weapon within its control, cannot right-
ly complain because the employer saw fit to follow suit."14 This
9. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
10. Such a group is generally referred to as the multi-employer bargaining
unit.
11. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959).
12. Betts-Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951) (to avoid accepting
new repair orders from customers requiring prompt service); International
Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951) (to avoid work stoppage) ; Duluth Bottling
Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943) (to avoid material spoilage); Link-Belt Co.,
26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940) (to prevent a sitdown strike.)
13. 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
14. Id. at 911.
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case follows the earlier broad language of Pepsi-ColZa Bottling
Co.' 5 that "an employer may lawfully discontinue or reduce op-
erations for any reason whatsoever . . . provided only that the
employer's action is not motivated by a purpose to interfere with
and defeat its employee's union activities."'16
The final category into which the courts have classified lock-
outs is the bargaining lockout. From the outset, a distinction
should be made between true bargaining lockouts, which are
attempts to check the union's power to strike within the frame-
work of collective bargaining,' 7 and lockouts designed to frus-
trate organizational efforts, undermine the bargaining represen-
tative, or evade the duty to bargain.'" In the latter situation, the
basic vice is not the lockout, but the fact that its purpose is
plainly incompatible with the right to organize and bargain
collectively.
The Board's initial position regarding the true bargaining
lockout was that it was an unwarranted and unjust exercise of
power by an employer.19 This position was shaken in 1962 in
NLRB v. Dalton Bqioe & Tile Gorp.20 which held valid a single
employer's right to lockout upon reaching an impasse in bargain-
ing negotiations. This decision further stated that the use of
economic bargaining weapons was legal unless motivated by anti-
union animus, and that a reasonable basis for finding this must
first be shown before an inference of improper motive can be
drawn. If the employer was merely "trying to make a better
bargain through the use of its economic arguments reinforced
by the pressure of work stoppage," 21 no violation was committed.
This distinction between the bargaining lockout, which is de-
signed to reduce the union's pressure by depriving it of the initia-
tive with respect to the timing of a shutdown, and the economic
lockout, which is designed to avoid the consequences of the
union's exercise of this initiative, is often difficult to visualize,
and many times was not recognized by the courts. Both situa-
tions may involve losses to employees, and both may also involve
15. 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947).
16. Id. at 602.
17. Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Morand Bros. Beverage
Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951).
18. Epstein, Disengagement From the Labor Contract: The Problem and a
Proposal, 50 CAr. L. Rav. 619, 626-27 (1962).
19. Charles Cushman Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 90 (1939), affd, 111 F.2d 681 (1st
Cir. 1940).
20. 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
21. Id. at 898.
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attempts to protect the economic integrity of a company without
any attempt to avoid the bargaining process. The distinction
was recognized by three cases2 2 which confirmed the National
Labor Relations Board's historic prohibition against single em-
ployer bargaining lockouts. 23 The general rationale of these
three decisions was that the employer's initiation of a lockout
to achieve a bargaining objective interfered with the employee's
right to strike. This was the status of the law until 1965.
In that year the United States Supreme Court established in
Amecan ,Ship Bldg. Go. v. NLRB once and for all the general
validity of the bargaining lockout.24 In this case the employer
temporarily laid off his employees solely to enhance his bargain-
ing position after an impasse in employment negotiations had
been reached. The Board's position was that lockouts presump-
tively infringed upon collective-bargaining rights of employees
in violation of section 8(a) (1), and a lockout, with its conse-
quent layoff, amounted to a discrimination within the meaning
of section 8(a) (3).25
Section 8 (a) (1)20 states that "it shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
The Board's holding was premised on the fact that the lockout
interfered with the right to bargain collectively and the right
to strike, which are guaranteed by section 7.2  It felt that
the use of this lockout "punished" the employees for the presen-
tation of an adherence to demands made by their union's repre-
sentatives, and provided the employer with the opportunity to
close down his operation before a strike could be held. Thus,
when and if the union decided to strike it would have nothing to
strike against. This view, in effect, would mean that "the right
to strike" encompassed not only this right per se, but also the
right to exclusive control of the timing and duration of strikes
calculated to influence the result of collective bargaining. The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this comprehensive view and
held that the "right to strike" is the right to cease work-nothing
22. Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Utah Plumb-
ing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961);
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).
23. See text accompanying note 19, supra.
24. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
25. Id. at 306.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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more. 28 Justice Stewart, writing the opinion of the Court, stated
that even though the union's bargaining position would be un-
doubtedly greatly enhanced if the Board's elastic interpretation
of section 7 were followed, the employer's use of a lockout solely
to support a legitimate bargaining position is not in any way
inconsistent with the right to strike.
Section 8(a) (3),29 the other section declared by the Board to
have been violated, prohibits discrimination in regard to tenure
or other conditions of employment to discourage union member-
ship. There is no violation of this section unless improper motive
on behalf of the employer can first be shown.3 0 The intent which
motivated the lockout and not the overall result is the determin-
ing factor to be considered. The simple fact that the ultimate
outcome of a particular lockout might discourage membership
in unions does not necessarily show that the lockout was called
for this particular purpose. This necessary anti-union animus
cannot naturally be inferred from the calling of the lockout
itself, but must be shown from extenuating circumstances or
outside factors which indicate that the employer called the lock-
out for the purpose of discouraging union membership or for
discriminating against the union in some other manner. Where
the sole objective of the employer was to reach a fair solution to
the labor dispute which existed between himself and his em-
ployees, no violation of section 8(a) (3) can be shown. The Su-
preme Court said that this is the only possible manner in which
this section could be construed in order to afford the employer
due protection in his right to manage his enterprise.3 1
This decision not only settled the question as to the validity of
the bargaining lockout by a single employer, but also set forth
some limitations on the Board which had not theretofore been
defined. Previously, the Board had denied the use of the lockout
to an employer because this would give him "too much power,"
for the employee's right to strike had been, in the Board's
opinion, sufficiently counterbalanced by means such as the power
to substitute new working conditions upon the expiration of his
contract with the union, to stockpile and subcontract, and to per-
manently replace employees who have gone on strike. The Su-
28. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 24, at 310.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
30. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) ; Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17 (1953); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1936).
31. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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preme Court rejected this evaluation and limited the Board's
authority to determine national labor policy by balancing the
competing interests of labor and management when dealing with
bargaining lockouts, in the absence of a finding of unfair labor
practice.
The American S ip Building case was recently reinforced by
a decision from the ninth circuit, NLRB v. Golden State Bottling
00.32 Briefly, the records of both of these cases show that
there was a long and satisfactory history of collective bargain-
ing; that the bargaining extended over a period of many months
and resulted during that period of time in proposals and counter-
proposals, compromises and agreements on issues that the bar-
gaining was at all times done in good faith; and, that finally,
an impasse resulted. After extended negotiations and futile at-
tempts to reach an agreement, the Golden State Bottling Com-
pany "locked out" its employees until they would agree to sign
an employment contract. At this point, the union members began
to disagree among themselves and subsequently split into two
factions-those willing to accept the proposed terms of the
employment contract, and those who still rejected them. At the
suggestion of the plant manager, the "willing to work" faction
met and elected new bargaining officers who signed the pro-
posed contract and work was resumed. The Board held that the
Golden State Bottling Co. was guilty of violation of sections
8(a) (1), 8(a) (2), and 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act.
The court of appeals was quick to apply the judicial reasoning
of Amenioan Ship Building in regard to sections 8(a) (1) and
8 (a) (3). These two sections are not violated unless there exists
a supportable finding of unlawful intent on the part of the
employer to injure the labor organization or to evade his duty to
bargain collectively or to discourage membership in the particu-
lar union involved in the controversy. Thus, further emphasis is
placed on the requirement that anti-union animus must be pres-
ent before an improper lockout situation will exist.
Section 8(a) (2)33 states in part: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the forma-
tion or administration of any labor organization . . ." The
Board found that this section had also been violated because the
union split into two factions with one faction electing new offi-
32. 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1958).
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cers and accepting the employer's proposals. The Board charac-
terized these events as an interference with the administration
of the union. On review, the court of appeals disagreed with this
finding. Even though the effect of this lockout was to disrupt
the orderly internal functioning of the union, it was still a law-
ful act. The employer's refusal to allow his employees to work
did not necessarily destroy the union's capacity for effective and
responsible representation, for this was merely one of the many
possible results which might have occurred because of the lock-
out. In order to sustain the holding of the Board, one of two
requirements must be conclusively shown-either that the em-
ployer was wrongfully motivated in the exercise of his right to
refuse work to his employees, or that the disruption of the union
was a necessary consequence of his actions.
This case is not actually as strong as it might appear. The
court concluded by finding that Golden State had interfered
with the administration of the union by the plant manager sug-
gesting to one of the two union factions that they elect their own
representatives, and by negotiating with these newly elected
representatives. In other words, this plant manager sought the
bargaining benefits of a lockout but was unwilling to assume the
burdens. His duty was to leave the union alone to work out its
own destiny. Absent these peculiar facts, however, the court
would have declared Golden State Bottling Company free of all
liability.
The function of the bargaining lockout is the same as that of
other apparently lawful arrangements designed to counter a
possible strike, such as subcontracting, renting machinery to
replace strikers, or indeed a publicity campaign to dramatize
the evils of allegedly wage-induced inflation. Bargaining lock-
outs do not involve an attempt to evade collective bargaining or
to bust the union any more than a strike is normally intended to
bankrupt the employer. The law in this area has moved its ful
cycle and returned generally to the rulings that existed at com-
mon law. Actually, there is no reason why this common law
construction should not prevail today, for perhaps the statutory
language the courts used to change the common law did not in
fact contemplate a change, but to the contrary, arguably em-
braced the bargaining lockout because the statutes never specifi-
cally prohibited it. Whether this cycle will be repeated, or
whether the law will become stabilized as it has in other lockout
situations, can only be answered by a speculative guess. Unless
1966]
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the present trend suffers a drastic reversal, subsequent cases will
follow the Golden State Bottling case and apply the rules of
American Ship Building.
WMIraAM W. WMIrWS, JIL
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-EXCEPTIONS-INTERPRE-
TATION OF EXCEPTIONS UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA
SUPREME COURT RULE 4, SECTION 6*
Appellate practice and procedure present myriad problems
to the practitioner and as a practical matter the technical must
be dispatched with facility in order to preserve the substan-
tive for hearing. The preparation of exceptions which conform
to the requirements of the Rules of the South Carolina Supreme
Court,' coupled with the court's various determinations of what
constitutes such conformity with the "rule for certainty"2 have
long plagued attorneys within this state. Failure to comply with
either the letter of the rule or with the court's interpretation
of it has traditionally provided a fertile ground for the dismissal
of appeals by the supreme court.
In its entirety, rule 4, section 6 provides that:
Each exception must contain a concise statement of one prop-
osition of law or fact which this Court is asked to review,
and the same assignment of error should not be repeated.
Each exception must contain within itself a complete assign-
ment of error, and a mere reference therein to any other ex-
ception then or previously taken, or request to charge will
not be considered. The exceptions should not be long or
argumentative in form.
The purported consequence of this rule is that the court con-
siders only those matters on appeal which are presented to it by
exceptions that are in conformity with the technical requirements
of the rule in form and substance. The practical problem arises
out of the fact that not every appeal heard by the court has been
borne up to it by exceptions which strictly conform to the lan-
guage of the rule; therefore, a determination of sufficiency in
advance of any ruling on the exceptions is difficult.
The consideration of exceptions and the cases which they repre-
sent reveals them to have been far from consistent. In many in-
stances the court will have effectively reviewed the record of the
pending cause in order to determine whether or not the technical
requirements for form and substance of exceptions have been met.
Where such a perusal reveals a meritorious assignment of error
* Boyer v. Loftin-Woodard, 146 SXE2d 606 (S.C. 1966).
1. 15 S.C. CODE ANN. 141 (1962).
2. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4 § 6.
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a decision may be rendered on the appeal regardless of the state
of the exceptions.
The whole spectrum of appellate procedure is fraught with
problems of sundry nature and description, but the scope of this
comment will be limited to a consideration of exceptions on ap-
peal-or more particularly, to the rule for certainty in exceptions
and the demands of the South Carolina Supreme Court for
compliance with it.
A. Boyer v. Loftin-Wloodard---Illustration, Not Conclusion
The case of Boyerv. Loftin-Woodard3 presents a typical illus-
tration of the court's dismissal of an appeal for failure of excep-
tions to meet the requirements of rule 4, section 6.
The plaintiff's tort action arose out of a one vehicle accident
alleged to have occurred as a result of the defendant's negligent
interference with the surface of a highway. The defense was
predicated on the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in the
operation of his truck, and at the proper times during the course
of the trial the defendant made motions for a non-suit and di-
rected verdict. The trial judge refused the motions, the case went
to the jury, and a verdict in the amount of actual damages was
awarded to the plaintiff. The defendant was then granted a
judgement NOV on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to
prove actionable negligence.
On appeal, the plaintiff's exceptions to the supreme court were
set out as follows:
1. His honor, the trial judge, erred in granting defendant's
motion for a judgement non obstante veredicto, the error
being that under the evidence a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the negligence and recklessness on the part of
the defendant was the direct and proximate cause of the
accident.
2. His honor, the trial judge, erred in granting defendant's
motion for a judgement non obstante veredicto, the error
being that it is not necessary under the testimony and evi-
dence to build inference upon inference in order to establish
the liability of the defendant.
3. His honor, the trial judge, erred in granting defendant's
motion for a judgement non obstante veredicto, the error
3. 146 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1966).
[VoL 18
27
Curlee: COMMENTS
Published by Scholar Commons,
CoN -Ts
being that testimony and evidence raised a reasonable infer-
ence that the plaintiff's damages were due to the negligence
and recklessness of the defendant and, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, presented a question of fact
for the jury to decide.4
In its per curiam dismissal of the plaintiff's appeal, the court
cited rule 4, section 6 as its grounds for determining that these
exceptions were "entirely too general, vague and indefinite to be
considered."1
5
The numerous decisions construing the rule are no less vague
than is the language of the rule itself; therefore, only an exhaus-
tive comparative expedition through the cases will serve to illum-
inate the practitioner's query as to whether or not a proposed
exception will meet the court's construction of what constitutes
compliance in a given instance. The volumes of the South Caro-
Zina Reports are replete with decisions dealing either exclusively
or in part with the present rule and its predecessors, but few of
these cases devote more than passing attempts at any real illus-
trative definition of the rule or the precise scope of its effec-
tiveness.
The disposition of Boyer's appeal in the instant case was ef-
fected in a manner which has characterized the method of imple-
mentation of this rule for certainty. The rule itself is set out, the
general language of cases dismissing other appeals in which
exceptions were found to be faulty is referred to, and the court's
consideration is terminated without specifically stating or even
directly alluding to the actual nature of the defect within the
exceptions.6
B. Application of Rule 4, Section 6 as a Standard for Exwceptions
The language of rule 4, section 6 is in all essential particulars
identical to that of the prior rules for certainty7 and indicates
by its preservation the intention of the court to maintain a rule
susceptible of broad constructive interpretation in dealing with
exceptions on appeal. Under the rule as it exists, the court has
determined that the object of an exception is to present a distinct
4. Id. at 607.
5. Ibid.
6. Solley v. Weaver, 146 S.E.2d 164 (S.C. 1966). In form and in language
this decision is essentially identical to the Boyer v. Loftin-Woodard opinion.
7. The earlier cases refer to SC. SuP. CT. R. 5 § 6. The rule is in effect
the same as the present codification's Rule 4, section 6.
19661
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principle or question of law which the appellant claims to have
been violated by the court which tried the case, and to present it
in such form that it may be properly reviewed."
In order to comply with the requirements, each exception must
contain a clear, succinct statement of the grounds upon which it
is based0 and generally exceptions will not be considered when
too indefinitely phrased or when an assignment of alleged error
is incompletely set out within the exception.' 0 Such statements
as these from cases disposed of under the rule, confirm that what
is envisioned by its language is a subjective determination of
whether or not compliance has occurred by the form of specific
exceptions. In applying this discretionary standard, the court is
loathe to decide cases on strictly technical grounds and has indi-
cated that "a good test whether an exception is too general is to
inquire whether it is so framed as to, involve the necessity of
retrying the whole case just as it was presented to the Circuit
Judge.""
This type of "rule of thumb" test by the court is derived from
the many cases holding that exceptions requiring a review of all
the evidence are too generally stated to be considered.' 2 The test
was conversely phrased in Brady v. Brady :13
We have held in many cases that every ground of appeal
ought to be so distinctly stated that the court may at once
see the point which it is called upon to decide without having
to "grope in the dark" to ascertain the precise point at issue.
In its application of rule 4, section 6 the court has manifested
its unwillingness to consider those exceptions which it deems to
be vague, indefinite, or general. Most typical of these instances
in which the dismissal is predicated on the failure of certainty is
the case in which the exception ascribes as error, in the granting
or denial of a particular motion by the trial court, the simple
8. Washington v. Muse, 150 S.C. 414, 417, 148 S.E. 227, 227 (1929).
9. Noif v. Patton, 114 S.C. 323, 103 S.E. 528 (1920); Holden v. Cantrell,
100 S.C. 265, 84 S.E. 826 (1915).
10. Cudd v. Moore, 126 S.C. 266, 119 S.E. 837 (1923).
11. Elklns v. South Carolina & Ga. R.R., 59 S.C. 1, 2, 37 S.E. 20, 20 (1900).
12. E.g., Weatherly v. Covington, S1 S.C. 55, 28 S.E. 1 (1897); Marshall v.
Creel, 44 S.C. 484, 22 S.E. 597 (1895).
13. 222 S.C. 242, 245, 72 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1952). See Gordon v. Rothberg,
213 S.C. 492, 50 S.E.2d 202 (1948); Pate v. C.I.T. Corp., 199 S.C. 244, 19
S.E.2d 107 (1942).
[Vol. 18
29
Curlee: COMMENTS
Published by Scholar Commons,
Co~A s
fact of such granting or failure to grant.14 Relying on its rule
for certainty and its previous decisions, the court determined
an exception to be entirely too general, vague and indefinite in
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. McElmurray,'5 where the exception
stated that the court had erred in granting the motion to strike
an answer as sham, frivolous, and irrelevant; the only error
assigned being that the motion made upon those grounds had
been granted.1
Dismissal of an appeal generally follows a finding of non-
compliance with the court's rules, but in some instances in which
there has been a specific finding that exceptions are too general
to satisfy the rule a resolution on the merits of the appeal is
made. In one such case, FCX Co-op. Serv., Inc. v. Bryant,17 the
court held inter alia that it would have been justified in dismiss-
ing the appeal because the large number of questions presented
in the appeal were unduly repetitious and because the require-
ment that points be raised in specific exceptions was completely
ignored. Illustrative of the defective exceptions in that case were
those which charged error in the direction of a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. The exceptions set out as grounds for error that
more than one issue could be drawn from the testimony, that the
credibility of the testimony was for the jury alone, and that the
evidence could support a verdict in favor of defendant on his
counterclaim. None of these exceptions clearly defines nor points
out any issue of fact which it is claimed should have been sub-
mitted to the jury; therefore technically "they leave the court
to search the entire record and are too general to be con-
sidered." 18
The question of sufficiency of exceptions may be raised by
motion of the respondent' or lack of conformity with the rules
may be noted by the court on its own motion. In Norton v. Liv-
ingston,20 one example of the latter occurrence, the appellant's
14. E.g., Concrete Mix, Inc. v. James, 231 S.C. 416, 98 S.E.2d 841 (1957)
(exception alleged error in failure to grant a non-suit on the ground that
plaintiff had failed to make out a case against the defendant); St. Andrew's
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. St. Andrew's Evangelical Lutheran Church,
223 S.C. 9, 73 S.E2d 845 (1952) (exception simply recited that the judgement
was contrary to law and evidence).
15. 236 S.C. 141, 143, 113 S.E2d 756, 757 (1960).
16. Id. at 142, 113 S.E.2d at 758.
17. 242 S.C. 511, 131 S.E.2d 702 (1963).
18. Id. at 514, 131 S.E.2d at 703.
19. E.g., Elkins v. South Carolina & Ga. R.R., 59 S.C. 1, 37 S.E. 20 (1900).
20. 14 S.C. 177 (1880).
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exception stated an objection to the judgement and to the entire
charge to the jury. Despite the obvious non-conformity with the
rule, no objection was made by the respondent to either the ex-
ception or the appeal. The court, however, indicated that it did
not consider such an imprecise exception to be in compliance
with the rules of the court and dismissed the appeal with the
admonition that:
The points of law wherein error is charged should be specifi-
cally stated in exceptions, otherwise the court has no guide
as to the points contested . ... This court is excluded from
considering the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, or
any other question except errors of law; and it is indis-
pensable to the satisfactory discharge of their duty that
these questions, submitted for their consideration, should be
separately and distinctly stated.21
As with any body of decisions based primarily on discretion
and limited only by subjective standards, inconsistencies appear
in the court's opinions in the determination of what constitutes
vagueness or indefiniteness within stated exceptions. Apparent
differences in the interpretation of the sufficiency of exceptions
have on occasion occurred within the text of a single decision.
In the case of Jumper v. Oommercial Bank' 22 an exception which
stated that "he [the trial judge] refused defendant's motion for
a non-suit"28 was sustained and its merits considered, while an-
other, stating that "he refused defendant's . . . requests to
charge"2 4 was dismissed as too incomplete for consideration. It
is difficult to see that the first of these exceptions is any more or
less concise or specific than the second, but in its consideration of
the appeal the court exercised its discretion and ruled on the first
while dismissing the second for defects in form.
Undoubtedly the greatest number of dismissals based on rule 4,
section 6 arise out of purported vagueness or indefiniteness con-
templated by the first phrase of the rule. In addition to and often
in the absence of defects of conciseness, however, exceptions are
deemed to be in violation of the segment of the rule requiring
21. Id. at 178.
22. 39 S.C. 296 (1893).
23. Id. at 297.
24. Id. at 298.
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within each exception a complete assignment of error based on the
record.
25
Nall v. Senn 26 presented an exception in which the factual
stage was set for the allegation of trial court error, but no com-
plete assignment of error was actually made; thereby leaving a
defective exception. The text of the exception related that:
Exception is taken to the Court's opinion that the plaintiffs
-were guilty of laches and estoppel for not commencing their
action against the defendants for the purpose of resolving
the controversy for a period of eight years from the date of
the deed . . . .27
In its refusal to consider the exception, the court charged that it
failed to meet the particulars of the rule for certainty in that it
did not point out nor even indicate what the claimed error was
in the lower court's ruling that the evidence established the stated
defenses.
In order to insure that a complete assignment of error was
set out by the exceptions, in Holden v. Cantrell,28 the court sug-
gested a procedure to be followed in revising them and granted
leave to the appellant to amend his defective exceptions. The
original exceptions merely made reference to grounds of motions
set out elsewhere in the record but did not within themselves con-
tain any complete assignment of error. The court instructed that
corrections should be made and the defects cured by incorporat-
ing the grounds into the body of the exceptions and stating in the
record that the exceptions correctly set out the grounds for the
motions and the error alleged.29 By following the suggested
procedure a complete assignment of error is contained within the
exception and the record corroborates the statement of fact ap-
pearing in the exception. The latter effect is essential because
the court will not consider exceptions which contain statements
of fact appearing only in the exception and not on the record.
Under this procedure both exceptions and the record were ren-
dered complete without necessity for repetition of factual
statements.
25. E.g., Gulledge v. Young, 245 S.C. 88, 138 S.E.2d 833 (1964) where the
sole exception offered, with its explanatory paragraphs, was too vague and in-
definite to comply with the court's rules, no complete assignment of error was
set out, and examination of the record indicated no abuse of discretion nor
manifest error of law or fact.
26. 242 S.C. 544, 131 S.E.2d 700 (1963).
27. Id. at 546, 131 S.E.2d at 701.
28. 100 S.C. 265, 84 S.E. 826 (1912).
29. Id. at 276, 84 S.E. at 828.
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Exceptions are objections stated to decisions of law arising out
of the trial of a matter ;30 therefore they must relate to matters
which were before the trial court and on which the trial judge
was given an opportunity to make a ruling.31 This rule, appli-
cable to appellate procedure generally, was passed upon in
Wilson v. Clary"2 and found by the court to be within the pur-
view of rule 4, section 6. Various exceptions raised questions
concerning the propriety of the lower court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute
involved in the litigation. These matters had not been advanced
by the appellant prior to their appearance in the exceptions and
counsel's brief, and consequently had never been before the trial
court for determination. The court held that it could not be
reasonably contended that the exceptions were proper because
questions not raised at the trial are not available on appeal.
33
The provisions of rule 4, section 6 instruct the appellant that
exceptions which merely refer to other exceptions then or pre-
viously taken and those which are lengthy or argumentative in
form are violative of the rule. As a practical matter, the latter
provisions have been seldom invoked by the court as an inde-
pendent defect sufficiently grave to require the dismissal of an
appeal.3 4 The more frequently used procedure in instances of
needlessly long and complicated exceptions or those argumenta-
tive in form is to dispose of the appeal by application of other
provisions of the rule for certainty or to grant leave to amend
the exceptions.
35
The prohibition against exceptions which merely refer to other
exceptions is primarily relied on to prevent an appellant's avail-
ing himself of matters not appearing in the record of the trial
in the circuit court. The situation most often arises where appeals
were first carried to the circuit courts from judgements by
masters, magistrates, or judges of probate and in the later appeal
from the circuits to the supreme court the exceptions assign error
on grounds appearing on the primary appeal but not encom-
30. Norton v. Livingston, 14 S.C. 177 (1880).
31. Gordon v. Rothberg, 213 S.C. 492, 50 S.E.2d 202 (1948).
32. 212 S.C. 250, 47 S.E.2d 618 (1948).
33. Id. at 257, 47 S.E.2d at 622.
34. See FCX Co-op. Serv., Inc. v. Bryant, 242 S.C. 511, 131 S.E.2d 702
(1963) where three pages of appellant's brief were devoted to some nineteen
questions-repetitious and phrased without regard to requirements of the court
rules. The appeal was disposed of on its merits rather than dismissed for de-
ficiencies in the exception.
35. Holden v. Cantrell, 100 S.C. 265, 277, 84 S.E. 826, 828 (1912).
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passed within the record from which the supreme court appeal
is taken. 0 This application of rule 4, section 6 receives limited
use by comparison to the incidence of reliance on the vagueness
provision, but it has been construed by the court and where ap-
plicable, exceptions must conform to these interpretative con-
structions or succumb to dismissal without ever having been
reviewed on merit.
Although the consideration of the supreme court's rule for
certainty has here been primarily centered about the cases in
which adherence to both letter and spirit of the rule was essen-
tial to prevent the dismissal of appeals, the rule is not adminis-
tered in a vacuum and where the court deems it to be in the
interest of justice the rule is generally waived. Such a waiver
may be dictated by the gravity of the case,37 as is the circum-
stance on many criminal appeals; or it may come from the court
as a matter of grace in cases in which it considers more appro-
priate an adjudication on the merits than a dismissal based on
technical infraction of the court's rules.38
Where the insufficiency of exceptions is not such that it would
mislead the respondent on the questions to be raised on appeal
and the record indicates merit in the appeal, the court construes
the form and the words of each exception as liberally as the
language will permit in order that it might decide the questions
involved without a dismissal.39 The court has in situations where
violation of the technical requirements existed, dismissed an
appeal without prejudice to the right of the appellant to rephrase
his grounds for appeal.
40
In considering the advisability of waiving breaches of rule 4,
section 6, the court determined in JackIson v. Carter41 that cir-
cumstances and merit should dictate.
If such examination of an exception as may be necessary to
disclose that it is framed in violation of this rule also dis-
closes that it clearly embraces a meritorious assignment of
36. E.g., Washington v. Muse, 150 S.C. 414, 148 S.E. 227 (1929); Neville
Bros. v. Kelley, 94 S.C. 112, 77 S.E. 743 (1913) ; Holtzclaw v. Green, 45 S.C.
494, 23 S.E. 515 (1896).
37. E.g., State v. Griggs, 184 S.C. 304, 192 S.E. 360 (1937).
38. E.g., Becker v. Uhe, 221 S.C. 334, 70 S.E.2d 346 (1952) ; Riddle v. George,
181 S.C. 360, 187 S.E. 524 (1936).
39. McMahan v. Walhalla Light & Power Co., 102 S.C. 57, 86 S.E. 194
(1915).
40. Hydrick v. Fairey, 132 S.C. 335, 128 S.E. 358 (1925).
41. 128 S.C. 79, 121 S.E. 559 (1924).
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prejudicial error, the Court will ordinarily waive the breach
of the rule and consider the exceptions.42
Adhering to this application of the rule in recent years, the
court overruled an objection by respondent to the form of a
patently defective exception in the case of Brady v. Brady,43
after an examination of the record disclosed a meritorious assign-
ment of error. Later in Hewitt v. Reserve Life Ins. 00.44 after
an ex gratia consideration of the merits of the appellant's excep-
tions, although their form did not comply with rule 4, section 6,
the court determined that the meritorious weight of the appeal
was adverse to appellant's position and that no error had been
made in the lower court.
The avowed intention of the court to decide meritorious ques-
tions on their merits rather than on technical violations of rules
of procedure is followed where practicable; however, circum-
stances do arise in which the court may find it either impractical
or impossible to waive a breach even though it may be inclined
by merit to effect a waiver. This unfortunate situation is most
readily envisioned where the appeal is not in such shape that it
enables a proper consideration of the merits because the order
from which the exception is made has not been made a part of
the record of the trial from which the appeal is taken.45
0. Simpson v. Cox-A Judicial Guideline
In Simpson v. Cox"4 the court expressed its concurrence with
the opinion shared by virtually all appellate benches, that the
consideration of exceptions which do not conform to court rules
is a vexatious task. It further agreed with the commonly held
view that where gross error occurs in the formulation of excep-
tions any court is warranted in dismissing an appeal without
further consideration. In speaking for the court however, Mr.
Justice Hydrick did not summarily dismiss appellant's appeal;
but rather seized the opportunity to provide some guidelines for
42. Id. at 86, 121 S.E. at 562.
43. 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1952). The single exception stated "that his
Honor... erred in sustaining the oral demurrer ... upon the ground that the
complaint did not state a cause of action, the error being that the complaint
does state a cause of action."
44. 235 S.C. 201, 110 S.E.2d 852 (1959) (exceptions simply stated that the
trial court erred in failing to grant judgment non obstante veredicto or a motion
for new trial).
45. Polson v. Burr, 235 S.C. 216, 110 S.E.2d 855 (1959).
46. 95 S.C. 382, 79 S.E. 102 (1913).
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the direction of future petitioners in the preparation of excep-
tions which comply with the requirements of the court's rule for
certainty and specification.
In Simpson, through an arrangement between all the parties
involved and in consideration of previous, related transactions,
the defendant executed a note secured by mortgage and endorsed
by the plaintiff to the Farmer's Bank which discounted it. In-
cluded in the discounted note was a note for seventy-five dollars
already owed to the bank by the defendant. The defendant failed
to pay the note at maturity, and the plaintiff paid the amount
of the note to the bank and brought an action for foreclosure
against the defendant. A special referee determined the matter
in favor of the plaintiff and ascribed the amount of damages
owed by the defendant.
On appeal from the judgement and award by the referee, the
defendant's exception alleged:
Error of said special referee on finding as a matter of fact
and so reporting the amount to be due plaintiff on said debt
to be fourteen hundred and ninety dollars principal and one
hundred and forty-nine dollars interest plus attorney's fee,
it being shown by the preponderance of the testimony that
the amount due plaintiff is not so much as that amount and
said referee committed error in concluding that plaintiff
is entitled to judgement of foreclosure against the defendant,
Cox, for such amount.47
The court agreed -with the determination of the circuit judge
that this exception was far too general to be considered proper.
The nature of an exception is to specify some definite error and
under the court rule a failure to do so is fatal to the exception.
The general language of the exception here does not direct the
court's consideration towards any particular error, but only
makes a statement which might or might not allude to one or
several avenues of error. All that is complained of is that the
amount of damages awarded by the referee was not a correct
amount and no suggestion of how or why the stated amount is
incorrect is embodied.
In order to clearly show that the exception was violative of
the rule requiring specification, by the very imprecision of its
phrasing, the court fully analyzed the body of the exception.48
47. Id. at 384-85, 79 S.E. at 102-03.
48. Id. at 385, 79 S.E. at 103.
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This judicial dissection revealed the impossibility of ascertaining
from the face of the exception the specifl error out of which
the complaint arose. At the conclusion of his consideration of
the many possible allegations of error which might be derived
from the defective exception, Mr. Justice Hydrick offered as a
substitute and cure for the appellant's exception a statement to
the effect that "the referee erred in including in the amount
found to be due on the mortgage debt the amount of defendant's
note for $75.00 to the Farmers Bank of Williamston." 49 In the
revised form, the precise point which the appellant desires re-
viewed is immediately apparent to the court without necessity of
its looking beyond the exception itself to ascertain the question
raised.
Realizing that the rule requiring specification in exceptions
must be administered with some degree of flexibility in order
that it might reasonably appertain to every appeal, Mr. Justice
Hydrick determined that the court's greatest service in rendering
a usable interpretation of the rule would be to set out the mini-
mum standards for compliance. Basically, the purpose of the
rule is to insure that exceptions be framed in such a form that
both the court and the opposing counsel may see at a glance the
point of law or fact which appellant is submitting for review
on appeal; therefore, under the rule it is unfair to permit any
generality of language which serves to mask the questions pre-
sented or to render them ascertainable only by aid of extraneous
explanation.5"
In implementing this primary function of the exception,
grounds or reasons upon which the assignment of error is predi-
cated may be included where they are not readily apparent from
a mere statement of the assignment itself. Argument and repeti-
tion serve only to cloud the presentation of error and should not
appear in the exception, but should be reserved for the brief.
Each assignment of error represents a unique ground for appeal;
therefore, each should be concisely stated in a separate exception
and where circumstances compel the inclusion of more than one
specification of error within a single exception, proper sub-
divisions must be employed. Only one exception should be used
to present a single assignment of error, and the patience of the
court should not be taxed with a point so attenuated that it
requires statement in a number of different forms to be seen or
49. Ibid.
50. Simpson v. Cox, 95 S.C. 382, 386, 79 S.E. 102, 103 (1913).
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understood. In the typical instance of where the grounds are the
same for all three, only one exception should be used to allege
error in the court's ruling on the motions for non-suit, directed
verdict and new trial.
In outlining this procedural format for the preparation of
exceptions which comply with the rule for certainty, the court
instructed that "counsel may act upon these suggestions with the
assurance that all objections which their exceptions specify will
receive the consideration of the Court."5 '
Rule 4, section 6 embraces a double aspect. Any mandatory
objective standard would open the door to the possibility that
either a meritorious appeal might fail on a mere technical in-
fraction or the unwarranted review of a flood of defective,
unworthy exceptions might ensue. Where exceptions are too
general or otherwise non-conforming, "there is much danger that
[only] a single grain of wheat may be effectually concealed in
so much chaff.15 2 Under the rule as it is in fact administered, the
determination of whether justice is better served by a recovery
of the single grain or by the efficient disposal of chaff and wheat
is left to the discretion of the court.
Whether or not strict adherence to the guideline established in
the Simpson case will serve today as a guarantee that an excep-
tion will be reviewed on appeal, or indeed whether any definitive
standard exists whereby compliance with rule 4, section 6 becomes
automatic, is difficult to ascertain. The preparation of excep-
tions, following some procedural guideline similar to that de-
scribed in Simpson will undoubtedly protect the practitioner
from the embarrassment of a dismissal for failure to meet the
requirements of the court's rule in the vast majority of appeals.
A greater degree of certainty than this is not possible so long as
interpretation of the rule is discretionary with the court.
RoBinT F. Fuum
51. Id. at 387, 79 S.E. at 103.
52. Ibid.
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PROPERTY-OVERFLIGHTS-RECOVERY NOT ALLOWED
IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION FOR AIRCRAFT NOISE*
Aircraft noise is presenting the courts with a serious problem
that reflects the growing pains of an ever expanding techno-
logical society. This is an issue which is being aggravated by the
development of larger and more powerful jet airplanes that pro-
duce tremendous roar and "whine."1 There are today more than
sixty-five million take-off and landing operations occurring
annually,2 and as the planes become larger their angle of flight
on take-off and landing becomes flatter, thus spreading the noise
over a greater area.3 With the jet age upon us and the rocket
age in the not-too-distant future, the law must adapt itself to
cope with the friction which is produced by a clash of conflicting
interests.
Property owners residing near airports often have their daily
lives interrupted by terrific blasts of noise and vibration pro-
duced by low-altitude jet aircraft. This is the problem considered
in a recent Kentucky case, Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd.
v. Porter.4 The plaintiffs brought an action based on "inverse
condemnation" 5 for the diminution in market value of their home
resulting from annoyances of a permanent or continuous charac-
ter attributable to the operation of a nearby airport. Damages
were awarded by the trial court for property loss sustained by
the excessive noise and vibration caused by jet aircraft. This
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. The
court held that even though there may have been a substantial
loss in property value, the activities of the county airport in
light of their importance to the community were not so unreason-
able as to compel compensation for damages.
* Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 149 (Ky.
1965).
1. A modem four-engine jet transport casts a 100 decibel overpressure on
the land to a distance of over three miles after take-off. See Hill, Liability
or Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19 U. MIAmI L.
nv. 1, 31 (1964). "Ear plugs are recommended for Air Force personnel when
the sound pressure level reaches 85 decibels and are required at or above 95
decibels." Batten v. United States, 306 F2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1962).
2. S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958). At this date the num-
ber would be vastly increased.
3. Harvey, Landowner's Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56
M IcH. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (1958).
4. 397 S.W2d 146 (Ky. 1965).
5. Inverse condemnation is a term used to describe an action brought against
a governmental body having the power of eminent domain to recover the loss
of property value which has been appropriated in fact without a formal exercise
of power.
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In early common law it was generally considered that property
owners had unlimited proprietorship of all superjacent airspace.6
The maxim aujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum-he who
owns the land owns the airspace above it up to the heavens-
provided the landowner with a cause of action in trespass for
any invasion.7 But with the advent of the Wright brothers'
winged machine the courts began to realize that this theory was
untenable.8 State legislatures also became aware of the desir-
ability of flight, and twenty-two states9 adopted a uniform law10
providing that ownership of airspace remained in the surface
owner, but subject to a right of flight. This apparent adherence
to the ad coelum maxim produced controversy,11 however, and in
1926 Congress, acting pursuant to the commerce power, passed
the Air Commerce Act12 which provided that airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight as prescribed by the Secretary
of Commerce was public property. The Secretary set the floor of
navigable airspace at 1000 feet over congested areas and 500 feet
elsewhere. 13
The United States Supreme Court considered the problem of
excessive aviation noise for the first time in United States v.
Causby.14 This case dealt with a poultry business which was
located near a military air base directly under a take-off and
landing path. Frequent low level aircraft flights produced in-
tense noise and vibration which harassed the owner and ruined
his business. In an action against the government the plaintiff
claimed that his property had been appropriated or taken and
that he was due compensation under the fifth amendment for
the devaluation in its market price. The Court considered the
old common law theory of complete ownership of airspace and
placed the doctrine at permanent rest. Speaking for the majority,
Mr. Justice Douglas said that "common sense revolts at the
idea. '13 It was realized that in order for modern day commerce
6. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 458, 90 N.W. 93, 95 (1902); see
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
7. E.g., Puroto v. Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401, 405, 62 Atl. 664, 665 (1905).
8. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932).
9. Ariz., Del., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J.,
N.C., N.D., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Wis.
10. UNIFORM STATE LAW FOR AERONAUTICS.
11. See, e.g., Hayden, Objections to the New Uniform Aeronautical Code,
18 A.B.A.J. 121 (1932).
12. 44 Stat. 568 (1926) as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1938).
13. 28 Fed. Reg. 6702.
14. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
15. Id. at 261.
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to develop and expand, public policy demanded that the air ways
be open to free, unrestricted navigation.
Since the objectionable flights were below that minimum alti-
tude established by the secretary under the Air Commerce Act,
the Court could have very easily found in favor of the landowner.
Rather than basing their decision upon some arbitrary floor,
however, the Court adopted a more elastic standard-that a
property owner has an interest in so much of the superjacent air
space as is necessary for his beneficial use and enjoyment of the
surface. It was held that the frequent low level flights so sub-
stantially deprived the landowner of this element in his rela-
tionship to the property that it did constitute a "taking." The
Court suggested that the property interest taken by the govern-
ment was equivalent to an easement of passage over the surface.
When the Causby decision based the landowner's remedy on
the theory that underlies eminent domain, the Court began speak-
ing in terms of easements and servitudes, and the confusion that
exists today can be attributed to the ambiguous language used
by the Court. It is difficult to determine exactly what was the
Court's conceptual analysis of a "taking." Nuisance and trespass
are two distinct legal entities, yet the Court in finding a "taking"
spoke in terms of both: "Flights over private land are not a
'taking' unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct
and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land."'
0
The Causby case brought out the fact that Congress had not
placed within the public domain that area needed for takeoff
and landing. This was remedied by the Federal Aviation Act of
195817 which expressly extended the navigable airspace of the
United States to include all airspace "needed to insure safety
in take-off and landing of aircraft." This act has not, however,
immunized low-altitude take-off and landing flights from prop-
erty owner suits. The Supreme Court held in Griggs v. County of
Allegheny"' that a landowner has rights of use and enjoyment
superior to those of the public in the same swath of navigable
airspace and that an action for damages 19 can still be maintained
16. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 246, 266 (1946).
17. 72 Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1958).
18. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
19. The Griggs case did not say whether injunctive relief would lie, and
commentators are split on this question. Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise-
The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs, 19 U. MTAmi L. REv. 1, 8 (1964); 8
Am. JuR. 2d Aviation §§ 5, 6, 61 (1963).
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if the owner is subjected to such interference as would constitute
a "taking" of his property. It was held that liability for the
diminution in market value of property rested upon the con-
demning authority which operated the airport rather than the
individual aircraft or the flight safety-regulating federal
authority.
Although in both Causby and G6iggs direct overflights were
involved, the interference that was held to constitute a "taking"
was not caused by the physical occupation of the column of air-
space but rather by the tremendous noise level in close proximity.
The beneficial use of the surface was the property interest at
stake, not some invasion of an imaginary column of air; there-
fore, the direction from which the interference came should have
been immaterial. In neither case was recovery specificially lim-
ited to direct overflight.20 These cases may have suggested that
relief was to be granted only to those directly beneath the flight
path, but they did not compel it.2 '
Since Causby, however, in actions against the federal govern-
ment the courts have followed a trespass theory and have re-
quired a direct physical invasion of superjacent air space before
recognizing a compensable "taking".2 2 The leading case on this
point, Batten v. United States,23 denied recovery for interference
brought about by airplane noise because flights were not directly
over the surface owned by the plaintiffs.
The jet airplane is a great boon to the traveler but a veritable
plague to the homeowners near an airfield. Noise, vibration,
and smoke incidental to the operation and maintenance of
jet planes disturb the peace and quiet in every residential
area located near an airport used by jets. This disturbance is
felt not only by those whose property is crossed by the planes
on take-offs or landings but also by those who live outside
of the established flight patterns.
24
Although realizing this vexed position of the landowners out-
side the flight path, the court held that no amount of sympathy
20. See City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1964).
21. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962) (Murrah, CJ.,
dissenting).
22. E.g., Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Pope
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ; Freeman v. United States,
167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958). It is to be noted that federal courts also
require substantial interference.
23. 306 F2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
24. Id. at 583.
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could change the legal principles involved. A primary distinction
pointed out was that the federal constitution protects a private
property owner from actions by the United States government
which take his property, not for actions which merely damage
his property.25 It was held that although there may be a sub-
stantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the property
resulting in a considerable diminution in value, if there is not
a direct invasion, then any damage incurred is merely conse-
quential and non-compensable under the fifth amendment. This
distinction between a "taking" and a "damaging" seems to be
based upon the arbitrary proposition that the fifth amendment
protects only a possessory interest in property. The concept of
an interest in property, however, deals not merely with the res
corporales but also with the unrestricted rights of beneficial use,
enjoyment, and disposal without unreasonable interference.
26
Nevertheless, illogical as it may seem, recovery against the fed-
eral government today is artificially limited to landowners
directly beneath the plane's path of flight, regardless of the
effects on adjacent landowners.
27
In actions against municipal or state government activities,
however, the strict trespass requirement has not always been
followed. 28 Unlike the federal constitution various state consti-
tutions have a provision which requires that private landowners
are to be compensated for either a "taking" or a "damaging" of
property.29 Therefore even in cases in which there have been no
direct overflights, various state courts have considered proceed-
ings against the state or local government in "inverse con-
demnation."
25. For a review of the principles relied upon see United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
99 U.S. 635 (1879) ; Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956);
Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
26. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945) ; Gasque
v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 21, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1939); 2, NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.1 (3d ed. 1963); see 63 CoLum. L. REv. 755 (1963).
27. E.g., Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Aaron v.
United States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963) ; Bellamy v. United States, 235 F.
Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734
(E.D.S.C. 1964).
28. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1964) ; Louis-
ville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Martin v.
Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964) ; accord, Board of Educ.
v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965).
29. 2, NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.44 (3d ed. 1963). Twenty-five states
so provide. It is to be noted that property owners are protected from state
action as well as from federal action by the fourteenth and fifth amendments.
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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In the recent Kentucky case"0 there had been no invasion of
airspace, but the court did not discuss this point because the state
constitution has a provision for either a "taking" or a "damag-
ing".31 Recovery was denied only because the court in balancing
the equities did not feel that the airport's activities were so
unreasonable as to compel reparations. The constitution of the
state of Washington also provides for both,32 and there recovery
has been allowed for interference sustained by property owners
outside of the flight path.83 The Washington court has gone even
further and held that compensation is to be awarded even if no
substantial interference is shown.34 This is a definite departure
from the majority of state jurisdictions which call for a bal-
ancing of interests and require that a plaintiff show substantial
interference with consequent diminution in the market value of
his property.35 Most state courts deem it necessary public policy
to require that an individual bear some inconvenience as a cost
of living in a modern, progressing society.86
Contrary to the Batten decision, which followed the trespass
theory, some states having only the provisions similar to that of
the federal constitution have allowed recovery on the basis of
nuisance.37 Oregon, for instance in Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land,38 was the first state that allowed recovery of damages for
excessive aircraft noise predicated upon the theory that a noise
nuisance could so ripen into an easement as to constitute a com-
pensable "taking". It was concluded that "a taking occurs when-
ever government acts in such a way as substantially to deprive
an owner of the useful possession of that which he owns, either
by repeated trespasses or by repeated non-trespassory invasions
called 'nuisance'."
3 9
30. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W2d 146 (Ky.
1965).
31. Ky. CONST. § 242.
32. WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16.
33. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P,2d 540 (1964), cert.
denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
34. Ibid.
35. 2, NicHOLS, EMNENT DoirN § 6.44(1) (3d ed. 1963); Comment, 39
WASH. L. REv. 920 (1965).
36. Ibid.
37. E.g., City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1964);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); accord,
Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965).
38. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
39. Id. at 192, 376 P.2d at 106.
1966]
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss2/7
SOuTH CArOLmA LAW IREviEw
By abandoning the necessity of trespass this court for the first
time held that property could be taken by unreasonable inter-
ference whether the noise vector came from directly above or
from some direction other than the perpendicular. A balancing of
interests was the standard used in determining whether the inter-
ference was so unreasonable as to constitute a "taking".
Although there have been no South Carolina state court cases40
dealing with excessive aircraft noise, the principles that underlie
the theory of "inverse condemnation" based upon the taking of
a noise easement are recognized. 41 The South Carolina constitu-
tion mentions only "taking",42 but the court has interpreted this
to include "damaging". 43 In this state the deprivation of the
ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of property is as much a
"taking" as if the property itself were physically appropriated.44
It would seem, therefore, that South Carolina would follow the
trend established by other states.45
When the Court in Causby granted relief based upon "inverse
condemnation" a new concept was provided to the harassed home-
owner to fight devaluation in property caused by aircraft inter-
ference. The federal courts have placed a limitation on this
concept in actions against the federal government by requiring
a physical invasion of the property. The reasoning behind this
limitation can possibly be explained by the federal courts' desire
for a definite cut-off point against a multitude of claims. 46
The trend in state courts,47 however, has been to avoid the
superficial approach of basing recovery strictly upon an arbi-
trary requirement of trespass. Since complaints allege substan-
40. There have been two recent federal cases, Bellamy v. United States, 235
F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964) and Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734
(E.D.S.C. 1964) ; see text accompanying note 27, supra.
41. Moss v. South Carolina Hwy. Dept., 223 S.C. 282, 75 S.E.2d 462 (1953);
Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1939).
42. S.C. Coxsr. art. 1, § 17.
43. E.g., Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 21, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873
(1939).
44. Ibid.
45. The South Carolina court probably would not grant injunctive relief for
nuisance because of the remedy of law in inverse condemnation. See Moss v.
South Carolina Hwy. Dept., 223 S.C. 282, 75 S.E2d 462 (1953).
46. See Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ;
19 U. MIAmI L. Rav. 1, 27 (1964).
47. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1964);
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, supra note 46; Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 309, 391 P. 2d 540 (1964) ; accord, Board of Educ. v. Palmer, 88 N.J.
Super, 378, 212 A.2d 564 (1965) ; cf. City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 140 S.E.2d 341
(N.C. 1965).
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tial detriment to the beneficial use of the surface and consequent
depreciation of the market value of their property, not inability
to use the airspace, the doctrine of nuisance is being applied in
actions in "inverse condemnation."
In order that the clash of interest brought about by an ad-
vancing technological age be equitably abated all factors and
circumstances involved should be weighed and balanced. In
America the ownership of property weighs heavy as a basic
individual right. No other influence provides such incentive for
responsible citizenship, and it is the foremost duty of government
to see that the sanctity of this right is not violated. If repara-
tions are to be denied it should be only for the reason that a
governmental activity is not so unreasonable as to violate this
right.
THoMAs H. CunE, Ji.
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